The parties are in dispute about the granting of education or training assistance for a course of studies on the threshold to retirement age.

The claimant, who was born in 1950, initially completed his secondary general school certificate (Hauptschulabschluss), then completed an apprenticeship and later worked in a number of occupations. At the end of 2014, he passed the university entrance qualification (Abitur) at an evening school. Since the beginning of 2016, he has been receiving an retirement pension and supplementary social benefits of basic income support. At the beginning of the winter semester 2015/2016, the claimant began a Bachelor's degree programme at university. For its first two semesters, the claimant, meanwhile 65 years of age, applied for education or training assistance to be granted by the defendant student services organisation.

The defendant rejected the application for assistance by the claimant. Both the claimant's objection (Widerspruch) as well as his actions brought before the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) and the Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) remained unsuccessful. The claimant's appeal on points of law was also unsuccessful.

11 The claimant's appeal on points of law is without merit. (...)

12 The basis of the legal assessment of the claim to assistance for the award period of October 2015 to September 2016, here in dispute, is the Federal Education and Training Assistance Act (BAföG, Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz) of 7 December 2010 (Federal Law Gazette (BGBl., Bundesgesetzblatt) I p. 1952; 2012 I p. 197) in the version of the Act of 23 December 2014 (BGBl. I p. 2475).

13 (...)

14 The only question in dispute - whether the claimant's age at the envisaged end of his studies has legal significance that impedes the claim to assistance - is ultimately to be answered in the affirmative. Under section 7 (1) BAföG, vocational training may be eligible for assistance even if the student or trainee will have reached retirement age upon its completion (1.). The claim to assistance is to be refused, however, because, for the aforementioned reason, the claimant does not fulfil the personal conditions for assistance of section 10 (3) BAföG (2.).

15 1. Under section 7 (1) BAföG, education or training assistance is (also) granted for at least three academic years of vocational training within the meaning of sections 2 and 3 BAföG until an ensuing vocational qualification has been acquired, at most until acquisition of a university degree or equivalent qualification. The opinion of the Higher Administrative Court with reference to a higher administrative court's decision (...) that a course of studies completed only after retirement age has been reached is not vocational training eligible for assistance within the meaning of this provision is not compatible with federal law.

16 The Senate's jurisprudence clarified that the concept of vocational training within the meaning of section 7 (1) first sentence BAföG relates solely to the legal characteristics that education or training eligible for assistance under the Federal Education and Training Assistance Act is abstractly required to have; in particular, the personal conditions of section 2 (1a) first sentence no. 1 BAföG are of no significance for the term "vocational training" (Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG, Bundesverwaltungsgericht), judgment of 28 May 2015 - 5 C 4.14 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2015:280515U5C4.14.0] - (...) para. 9). The same applies to the personal characteristic of age.

19 2. The claim to assistance is to be refused, however, because the claimant does not fulfil the personal conditions for assistance of section 10 (3) BAföG. This provision excludes assistance if a student or trainee - like the claimant - will already have reached retirement age upon completing the education or training according to schedule for which they claim education or training assistance. That follows from the interpretation of the norm (a). Contrary to the claimant's view, this result of the interpretation is also compatible with higher or preceding law (b). On this basis, the Higher Administrative Court's judgment proves to be correct in its result (c).

20 a) Under section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG, education or training assistance is not granted to students or trainees who have reached the age of 30 at the beginning of the education or training segment for which they have applied for education or training assistance, and in case of courses of studies under section 7 (1a) BAföG, to students or trainees who have reached the age of 35. The decisive age limit here is 30 years, since the claimant was undertaking a Bachelor's degree programme and was thus not pursuing a course of studies under section 7 (1a) BAföG. He has passed this age limit.

21 The age limit referred to in section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG is not applicable if the student or trainee has acquired the entrance conditions for the education or training aspired to (in this case university studies) at evening school or a similar institution (section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG) and starts the education or training immediately after achieving the entrance conditions (section 10 (3) third sentence BAföG). According to the Higher Administrative Court's findings, which are binding on the Senate (section 137 (2) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung)), these conditions have been fulfilled, which is not a matter of dispute between the parties (anymore). The exception rule of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG does not apply, however, if the student or trainee will already have reached retirement age upon completing the education or training according to schedule for which they claim education or training assistance because this is then no longer "education or training for which assistance is to be provided" within the meaning of this provision. This follows from the interpretation of the norm, particularly considering the systematic connection and purpose of the Act and its legislative history.

22 aa) The wording of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG does not oppose this. It does not contain any explicit age limit for an application exception within the meaning of a (maximum) age limit for assistance for a course of studies after acquiring the higher education entrance qualification in second-chance education. However, the ordered non-applicability of the age limit of 30 or 35 years established in the first sentence of the provision does not exclude the possibility of inferring a further age limit from the provision. Because such a limit is within the possible meaning of the legal provision, there is, contrary to the view of the Administrative Court, no reason for judicial development of the law in the form of teleological reduction (teleologische Reduktion) (see, on this point, BVerwG, judgment of 22 May 2014 - 5 C 27.13 - (...) para. 21 with further references), although it is likely that its conditions have also been fulfilled in view of the purpose of the provision to be taken into account in the present context, which is presented below. The above-mentioned sentence, to the effect that section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG contains a (further) maximum age limit for the eligibility of assistance for education or training, already follows from an interpretation linked with normative statements, made in consideration of the provision's systematic connection and, in particular, purpose.

23 (1) The aforementioned result of the interpretation of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG, contrary to the claimant's view, does not impermissibly override the wording of the Act; there is no blocking effect on further interpretation. The text of the norm of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG does not say that there is no other age limit in the case for which it provides; rather, it leaves open whether another interpretation of the provision could lead to an assumption that there is another age limit beyond 30 or 35 years.

24 The normative connecting factor for this is the concept of "education or training for which assistance is to be provided" in section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG. Incidentally, relevant starting points in the text of the norm for such an interpretation may also be inferred from other case groups of section 10 (3) second sentence BAföG. The meaning of the term "education or training for which assistance is to be provided" under section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG may not be intended only in a descriptive sense as the education or training for which assistance is the object of the claim asserted. It may also be understood to be "education or training eligible for assistance" and thus open to interpretation as a connecting factor for further content-related requirements to be made of such education or training. It follows from the provision's systematic connection, its spirit and purpose as well as its legislative history that the detailed content of these requirements constitute a further age limit.

25 (2) From a systematic point of view, section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG is attached to the exception provision of section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG as a (counter-)exception. The reduction of the age limit for education or training assistance from 35 to 30 years, undertaken in 1979 as a basic principle and still applicable today, was based on the legislature's consideration of wanting to more strongly emphasise the Act's "youth policy objective" (...). It thus makes reference to the general aim of the Federal Education and Training Assistance Act of assisting young people, which is essentially based on the interest of the general public in having qualified young workers (...), and which the legislature has upheld, in spite of different proposals, up to the recent past, also with reference to maintaining the age limit (...). Building on this, the purpose of the general age limit under section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG is to take into account a low level of the general public's interest in exhausting educational reserves if the likely occupational period after completing the education or training is only relatively short and the individual, before reaching the limit of section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG, is generally able to start education or training eligible for assistance (see Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, Bundesverfassungsgericht), decision of 15 September 1980 - 1 BvR 715/80 - (...)). It expresses the legislature's intention primarily to provide education or training assistance for young people (see BVerwG, judgment of 13 November 1980 - 5 C 29.79 - (...) para. 41; (...)).

26 The rationale underlying the exception provision of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG, however, in the sense of a hardship clause, is to compensate for any disadvantages resulting from the reduction of the general age limit to 30 years for people gaining qualifications in second-chance education. The intention is that such people, even after exceeding the age limit, should have the same occupational qualification opportunities as are generally already available to other students or trainees at a younger age (see BVerwG, judgment of 21 November 1991 - 5 C 40.88 - (...)). The compensation for disadvantage associated with this intention accepts extensive limitation of considering the interests of the general public, because such compensation is not associated with the expectation that the student or trainee will be able to work for an appropriate length of time (regarding section 10 (3) second sentence no. 3 and 4 BAföG, see BVerwG, judgment of 9 May 1985 - 5 C 48.82 - Rulings of the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts) 71, 268 <278 et seq.> and decision of 6 November 1991 - 5 B 121.91 - (...)). However, by refraining from complying with the age limit of section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG, the legislature was not intending at the same time to allow assistance for vocational training to be granted for its own sake, by entirely decoupling it - also with regard to age - from its main purpose, which is to increase the reserves of qualified young workers in the interests of the general public or also to contribute to the economic advancement of the individual (on the latter, see BVerwG, judgment of 9 May 1985 - 5 C 48.82 - BVerwGE 71, 268 <279>). Otherwise, section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG would lose entirely the function the legislature intended it to have - compensating disadvantage - and would become a privileging provision completely detached from the conditions for assistance of section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG. Such an intention on the part of the legislature is to be ruled out. Thus, the provision does not have the purpose of providing education or training assistance beyond an age at which use of the vocational qualifications thereby gained is no longer likely because these do not lead to the practice of an occupation.

27 (3) It cannot be inferred from the legislative history of the provision that the legislature was intending or aiming to extend the privilege of persons completing second-chance education by means of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG so far that no age limit at all would apply to education or training assistance under this provision. Primarily, the wording used in the explanatory memorandum for the bill of the Federal Government that assistance opportunities should be granted "independent of an age limit" or "independent of the age of the student or trainee" (...), may point in this direction. However, as shown in the statements on the non-application of the age limit on account of the type of education or training or the situation in the individual case (...), this specifically considers dispensing with the age limit of 30 years, but does not state that the legislature was thereby also intending to dispense with the intrinsic requirement of assistance for vocational training that there was the possibility of pursuing a gainful activity.

28 bb) The determination of content, corresponding to the legislative assessment, that the age limit accordingly enshrined in section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG, from which it is no longer likely that use will be made of education or training, may also be concluded from the systematic connection and the spirit and purpose of this provision.

29 From a systematic point of view, it is to be considered that the legislature determined the general age limit under section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG on the basis of a standardising assessment (see BVerfG, decision of 15 September 1980 - 1 BvR 715/80 - (...)). The legislature also drew on standardised exceptional constellations with regard to the privileging provisions of section 10 (3) second sentence BAföG. This is an argument in favour of the position that the legislature also wished to answer the question as to when education or training is no longer eligible for assistance because it is no longer likely that it will be used in the sense of practising an occupation on the basis of a standardising assessment. Such standardisation also appears appropriate because the underlying purpose of the age limit, at least to a significant extent, is to protect the interest of the general public, and, to that extent, it is not necessary to consider individual cases. Regarding content, it seems obvious in this context to use as a basis the legislative assessments arising from the general provisions on the regular retirement age for receiving a pension under section 35 second sentence and section 235 (2) of the Social Code Book VI (SGB VI, Sozialgesetzbuch Sechstes Buch) (see, to this effect, BVerwG, judgment of 9 May 1985 - 5 C 48.82 - BVerwGE 71, 268 <279> and decision of 6 November 1991 - 5 B 121.91 - (...)); in principle, these are also authoritative for civil servant status (see section 25 of the Act on the Status of Civil Servants (BeamtStG, Beamtenstatusgesetz) and section 51 of the Act on Federal Civil Servants (BBG, Bundesbeamtengesetz)). By means of these provisions, the legal system indicates the point in time when it considers the obligation of the vast majority of occupational groups and professionals to earn their own living through gainful activity as having been reached in principle, and which is also relevant for receipt of other social benefits related to gainful activity (see section 7 (1) first sentence no. 1 and section 7a of the Social Code Book II (SGB II, Sozialgesetzbuch Zweites Buch)). This allows the prognostic assessment that beyond this age limit, starting a gainful activity for the first time in a new occupational field is unlikely. Reaching the regular retirement age within the scope of application of social security law does not in itself lead to the termination of an employment relationship under the provisions of labour law, and, moreover, also does not comprise an employment ban. It is also correct that for some time, the legislature has been pursuing the intention of making the transition from working life to retirement more flexible. However, the particular aim of the facilitations this involves, in addition to improving the possibility of combining an income from part-time work with an early retirement pension, is to remove barriers existing under labour and pension insurance law to continuing existing employment beyond the regular retirement age under pension law (see, for example, section 41 third sentence SGB VI). They do not call into question the general assessment, also based on life experience, that of those persons engaged in a gainful activity beyond this age limit, only a vanishingly small proportion started working in an entirely newly learnt occupation after reaching this age limit. Thus, it is irrelevant that a quite considerable proportion of the persons engaged in a gainful activity, namely the self-employed, are completely unaffected by the regular retirement age under pension law.

30 cc) Contrary to the claimant's view, no other conclusion follows from section 2 (2) and section 31 of the Social Code Book I (SGB I, Sozialgesetzbuch Erstes Buch), which are to be considered here on account of section 68 no. 1 and section 37 second sentence SGB I. The interpretation rule of section 2 (1) SGB I contains no contradiction to methodological principles, but requires a citizen-friendly interpretation of the law, insofar as such interpretation is possible on the basis of recognised methods (established jurisprudence, see Federal Social Court (BSG, Bundessozialgericht), judgments of 10 November 2011 - B 8 SO 12/10 R [ECLI:DE:BSG:2011:101111UB8SO1210R0] - (...) para. 23 and of 8 February 2012 - B 5 R 38/11 R [ECLI:DE:BSG:2012:080212UB5R3811R0] - (...) para. 23 with further references). That is why section 2 (2) SGB I is significant when doubts remain as to the right result, taking all interpretation criteria into account. There are no such doubts in this case. Section 31 SGB I is also without prejudice to the content of a norm being identified by the recognised methods of interpretation because, under this section, it is sufficient for the law to "allow" a legal consequence, that is, only implicitly to have corresponding content (...).

31 b) This interpretation of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG is compatible with higher or preceding law.

32 aa) First, it does not give section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG any content that violates the right to participation deriving from article 12 (1) of the Basic Law (GG, Grundgesetz) in conjunction with article 3 (1) GG and the social state principle deriving from article 20 (1) GG.

33 (1) The state has an objective legal obligation deriving from article 12 (1) in conjunction with article 3 (1) GG and the social state principle enshrined in article 20 (1) GG to create and maintain an education and training assistance system to enable the participation of needy students or trainees in the training places provided by the state. According to this principle, the legislature is not only forbidden from designing access to education or training establishments in a way that is prohibitive. It follows from the principle of equal-opportunity access to state-created education or training capacities granted by the basic rights that the legislature must not stand idly by and tolerate existing prohibitive barriers to access, such as lack of means, but must take action to remove them, enabling students or trainees who have received such a training place, but lack means, to actually undergo the education or training. A subjective right of needy students or trainees to assistance by the state that actually enables them to participate corresponds with this objective legal obligation. In designing education and training assistance law, however, the legislature has a broad scope for action. It has the obligation to determine the personal and material conditions for granting education or training assistance, including qualification and performance requirements; in view of the fact that education or training assistance is granted through mass administration and depends on results being as simple as possible to achieve, while being quick and unambiguous, it may to a large extent resort to generalisations and standardisation. Moreover, it has broad scope with regard to the design of assistance, in principle and also with regard to its modalities (BVerwG, decision of 20 May 2021 - 5 C 11.18 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2021:200521B5C11.18.0] - (...) para. 16, 21 and 30).

34 The interpretation of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG, according to which education or training for which assistance is to be provided within the meaning of this provision no longer exists when the student or trainee will already have reached retirement age upon completing the education or training according to schedule, is compatible in particular with the right to equality under article 3 (1) GG when these principles are used as the basis for framing the right of access to education or training assistance. Since the differentiation at issue here is made on the basis of the personal and non-disposable characteristic of age (see BVerfG, decision of 27 July 2016 - 1 BvR 371/11 [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160727.1bvr037111] - BVerfGE 142, 353 para. 69 with further references), the standard of strict proportionality is to be applied in the context of the continuously adjustable assessment of justification. In this context, the legislature's powers for standardisation affect on the one hand any assessment of the need to use differentiation characteristics and on the other the hand the standards used to assess appropriateness (see, most recently, BVerfG, decision of 8 July 2021 - 1 BvR 2237/14 et al. [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2021:rs20210708.1bvr223714] - (...) para. 110 et seqq.).

35 (a) Firstly, the age limit determined by interpreting section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG pursues a constitutionally legitimate purpose, namely to limit assistance, also in the interest of the general public, to circumstances where a course of training can still lead to an occupational activity, i.e. an occupation intended to be long-term and aimed at remuneration (see BVerfG, decision of 15 September 1980 - 1 BvR 715/80 - (...)); this is also the maximum extent of the protection of the basic right to education or training assistance under article 12 (1) GG in the present context.

36 (b) Reference to the age limit as a standardising characteristic, which does not take every individual case into account, is to be regarded as suitable and necessary to achieve this purpose. Under certain conditions, the legislature may use standardising regulations without violating the right to equality simply on account of the unavoidable disadvantage to individuals this involves. In doing so, it may be guided in principle by the typical case and neglect special characteristics - which are factually known - by making generalisations. Particularly when structuring mass phenomena, it is not required to be concerned about all conceivable individual cases under all circumstances. Standardisation is possible in particular when a regulation must be adopted concerning uncertain circumstances or events which cannot be determined with certainty even when viewing the individual case in detail (see BVerfG, decision of 8 July 2021 - 1 BvR 2237/14 et al. - (...) para. 149 et seq.).

37 The age limit at issue here is standardising to the extent that it does not ask in each individual case whether it is no longer possible for the students or trainees concerned to practice an occupation after completing their education or training. It is to be deemed suitable for achieving the purpose because it is oriented towards a relevant case defined as typical by the legal order itself. The legal order itself assumes an upper limit - regular retirement age - up to which, typically, persons are required to earn their own living themselves through their own gainful activity; upon reaching retirement age, this is replaced by a pension claim. This does not apply to all professions, particularly not to self-employed professions. At the same time, however, it must not be overlooked that the vast majority of all professionals are engaged in occupations subject to the regular retirement age, and that, despite all the opportunities to extend working times, including the ones provided for by law, general life experience shows that this retirement age continues to be upheld in the vast majority of cases. To this extent, the age limit at issue depicts a typical case that is recognisably true to reality, in the sense of a general picture, without any need for further findings. It is also necessary because education or training assistance relates to structuring a mass phenomenon. In addition, a strict case-by-case examination would not be possible in this particular case because such examination relates to objectively highly uncertain circumstances or events, particularly the question of whether it will still be possible for a particular person to work in their desired occupation in future in spite of their high age.

38 (c) Finally, the age limit determined by interpreting section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG is also appropriate. Unequal treatment is only appropriate if the extent of unequal treatment is proportionate to the significance of the objective pursued by the differentiation and to the extent and level of the achievement of the objective effected by means of the unequal treatment. If the provisions concerned are standardisations, the extent of the unequal treatment caused by them must not be very intensive. What is also significant is whether the hardship would only be avoidable with difficulty; practical administrative requirements are also important here. The advantages arising from standardisation must be proportionate to the inequality they inevitably involve (see BVerfG, decision of 8 July 2021 - 1 BvR 2237/14 et al. - (...) para. 222). To this extent, it may be assumed on the basis of an evaluative assessment that only a very small number of people immediately before retirement age begin education or training eligible for assistance under the conditions of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG and may subsequently wish to start a new occupation. Insofar as hardship still subsequently occurs in an individual case, this is unavoidable because it is practically impossible for the administration granting assistance to conduct a sufficiently reliable examination of whether a gainful activity in a new occupation will be taken up in old age in a particular case, due to manifold unpredictable factors. Thus, in this connection, there is no need for hardship clauses to achieve justice in the individual case.

39 (2) The exclusion of persons from education or training assistance, who, having reached the retirement age, still wish to pursue education or training which, on its merits, is eligible for assistance under the conditions of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG, also does not violate the right to be granted a minimum subsistence level in line with human dignity in accordance with article 1 (1) in conjunction with article 20 (1) GG insofar as they would consequently also be denied basic security benefits in their retirement age on the basis of section 22 (1) first sentence of the Social Code Book XII (SGB XII, Sozialgesetzbuch Zwölftes Buch). Such exclusion is not in dispute here and incidentally would not affect the constitutionality of the interpretation of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG at issue here, but, if at all, would only raise the question of constitutional interpretation of section 22 SGB XII or of its constitutionality in case of collision with old-age basic security benefits.

40 bb) Finally, the age limit derived by way of interpretation of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG is also compatible with EU law. It neither constitutes discrimination in breach of the principle of equal treatment on account of age within the meaning of article 2 (1) and article 1 of Directive 2000/78/EC (1), nor can such a breach be substantiated by reference to the general principle of non-discrimination under EU law (2).

41 (1) The purpose of Directive 2000/78/EC is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination, inter alia on the grounds of age, as regards employment and occupation (article 1 of Directive 2000/78/EC). According to article 3 (1) (b) of Directive 2000/78/EC, employment and occupation, the terms it uses, include access to all types and levels of vocational training; to this extent, they are relevant in principle to the case at issue here, because the purpose of assistance under the Federal Education and Training Assistance Act is to secure financially the individual's right of access to vocational training. Nevertheless, no decision is required as to whether the age limit at issue here is to be regarded as a justified unequal treatment within the meaning of article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC. This is because the Directive is not applicable as a standard of review in the present case.

42 Under article 3 (3) of Directive 2000/78/EC, it does not apply to payments of any kind made by state schemes or similar, including state social security or social protection schemes. This excludes its application to the financial assistance system of the Federal Education and Training Assistance Act, despite the fact that the Directive covers access to vocational training per se (...). The systematic connection of article 3 (3) to article 3 (1) (b) of Directive 2000/78/EC is evidence that the exclusion covers all state payments specified in article 3 (3) intended to provide access to all forms of vocational training economically possible in the first place. This is confirmed by recital 13 (see, on this point, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, hereinafter Court of Justice), judgment of 21 January 2015 - C-529/13 [ECLI:EU:C:2015:20], Felber - para. 20), according to which the Directive does not apply to two groups of cases ("... not ... nor...") involving "any kind of payment by the state aimed at providing access to employment". Historical interpretation has reinforced this finding with regard to the assistance character of state payments: The specified area excluded was originally not envisaged in the Commission's draft Directive and was also not included in the parliamentary procedure. Rather, it is based on a proposal by the Council at the final stage of consultations, which envisaged that the Member States should be granted the right to exclude from its scope of application, inter alia any kinds of payment made within the framework of systems established by law, including ones that promote access to employment (Council document no. 11352/00 p. 15 footnote 18 and Council document no. 11713/00 p. 6). This proposal found recognisable expression in recital 13.

43 (2) Contrary to the claimant's view, there has also not been any breach of the general principle of non-discrimination under EU law. Insofar as a principle of non-discrimination on account of age derives from the general principles of EU law, Member States' commitment to it follows from the provision of article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), the effect of which is that they are only bound when applying and implementing EU law within the meaning of article 51 (1) first sentence CFR. Such implementation of EU law is not taking place here.

44 The Court of Justice originally derived the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as a general principle of Community law by recourse to older judgments from constitutional traditions common to the Member States and international law (CJEU, judgment of 22 November 2005 - C-144/04 [ECLI:EU:C:2005:709], Mangold - para. 74 et seq.). Following the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it also initially cited article 21 (1) CFR as a rationale on the strength of which the principle of non-discrimination "now" must be regarded as a general principle of EU law (CJEU, judgments of 19 January 2010 - C-555/07 [ECLI:EU:C:2010:21], Kücükdeveci - para. 21 et seq. and 19 April 2016 - C-441/14 [ECLI:EU:C:2016:278], Dansk Industri - para. 22). In later rulings, substantiation of a general principle of EU law was based only on article 21 CFR (CJEU, judgments of 17 April 2018 - C-414/16 [ECLI:EU:C:2018:257], Egenberger - para. 47 and 76, of 11 September 2018 - C-68/17 [ECLI:EU:C:2018:696], IR - para. 69 and 71 and of 22 January 2019 - C-193/17 [ECLI:EU:C:2019:43], Cresco - para. 76). As a consequence of this transposition of the general principle of non-discrimination into article 21 CFR, the provision on the scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights deriving from article 51 (1) first sentence CFR is also applicable (see CJEU, judgment of 17 April 2018 - C-414/16 - para. 49; (...)).

45 However, circumstances that fall within the scope of EU law within the meaning of article 51 (1) first sentence CFR and lead to the applicability of article 21 CFR do not exist here. Circumstances fall within the scope of EU law if there is a sufficient connection at a certain level between an EU legal act and the national measure at issue. Merely the fact that a national measure falls within an area where the EU has competence cannot bring this measure within the scope of EU law. For this to happen, EU law must create certain obligations on the part of Member States in relation to the national circumstances by means of which their activity in the broader sense is deemed to fulfil EU obligations or authorisations constituting the implementation of EU law, including secondary legislation (see CJEU, judgment of 13 January 2022 - C-363/20 [ECLI:EU:C:2022:21], Marcas - para. 38; (...)).

46 In the present context, the national circumstances are that persons who have exceeded the regular retirement age when they complete education or training eligible for assistance are excluded from assistance under the Federal Education and Training Assistance Act. In relation to this, EU law does not create any requirements, because neither Directive 2000/78/EC nor any other EU law in another way are applicable to this assistance, which means that there is also no connection whatsoever between an EU legal act and the circumstances.

47 c) On this basis, the result established by the Higher Administrative Court proves to be correct. According to the findings of the Higher Administrative Court, it is estimated that the claimant would have been 69 years of age upon completing his studies within the period relevant here; thus, upon completing his studies according to schedule, he would have far surpassed the regular retirement age applicable to him of 65 years and four months (section 235 (2) second sentence SGB VI; year of birth: 1950). Thus, the claim asserted does not exist, because education or training assistance under section 10 (3) first sentence BAföG will not be granted in this case, due to exceeding the age limit of 30 years, and the privileging provision of section 10 (3) second sentence no. 1 BAföG does not apply.