The claimant, by his own account an Afghan national of the Sunni faith and Pashayi ethnicity born in 1996, seeks the granting of subsidiary protection.

The claimant is from a village in Nangarhar province. He left Afghanistan in September 2015 and by his own account entered the federal territory in mid-October 2015. As reasons for his asylum application lodged in November 2015, he stated in essence that as an employee of the UN World Food Programme, he had received a threatening letter from the Taliban through his father, demanding that he should cease his work for the aid programme and join the Taliban. He thereupon did not return to his home village, and emigrated.

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, hereinafter Federal Office) rejected his asylum application by notice of 24 October 2016, warned the claimant of deportation to Afghanistan, setting a time period for him to depart the country, and limited the time of the legally prescribed ban on entry and residence to a period of 30 months from the date of deportation. The Federal Office held that the claimant was not threatened with any persecution relevant under refugee law, and in any event in some cities of Afghanistan that were accessible to him, there was internal protection of which he could reasonably be expected to avail himself. The Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) dismissed the action in full.

By judgment of 29 November 2019, the Higher Administrative Court (VGH, Verwaltungsgerichtshof) dismissed the claimant's appeal on points of fact and law, which it had granted leave to bring with regard to the defendant's obligation to grant subsidiary protection, and stated in essence: It could be left open whether there was a considerable probability for believing that in his home region the claimant would face a serious and individual threat to his life and physical integrity by reason of indiscriminate violence (section 4 (1) second sentence no. 3 of the Asylum Act (AsylG, Asylgesetz)), because he had access to internal protection (section 3e (1) AsylG) in Afghanistan's three major cities (Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif). In the designated cities the claimant would be free from a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm; in particular, there could be no expectation that the Taliban would maintain an on-going interest in persecution there. In any event, the claimant could safely and lawfully travel to these three cities by air; there were also no legal or administrative impediments to his in-migration.

The claimant could reasonably be expected to settle in one of those three cities (reasonableness of settlement). A reasonable expectation of settlement required more than mere freedom from persecution and serious harm. The living conditions and other circumstances in the place of internal protection also could not be such that the person concerned would feel compelled to leave (again) the part of the country that was safe from persecution or serious harm because he could not live there in conditions fit for human beings. Settlement in a safe part of the country could in any event reasonably be expected if, in a comprehensive consideration of all circumstances of the individual case, a minimum subsistence level maintaining the guarantees under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was secured, and if there was also no risk of any other serious violation of fundamental or human rights or any other unbearable hardship. In the place of internal protection the subsistence of the person concerned must be secured in such a way that that person has an adequate basis for subsistence on the basis of the economic and social conditions; if the situation in the presumed place of protection results in a breach of article 3 ECHR, internal protection is ruled out. Exactly what guarantees proceeded from fundamental and human rights, and whether these rights specifically opposed settlement, must be examined in a comprehensive consideration of each individual case; the circumstances to be taken into account encompass objective aspects, particularly the economic and humanitarian conditions including healthcare, and subjective circumstances, such as age, gender, family and biographical background, health status, financial situation with reference to assets and employment opportunities as well as benefits from assistance made available to returnees, skills/education or training/professional experience, the presence of viable social relationships/networks in the place of internal protection, knowledge of at least one of the languages spoken in the place of internal protection, and if applicable, ethnicity. These minimum requirements conformed to those that proceeded from international and EU law, which focused on whether the person concerned would be exposed, at the place in question, to treatment prohibited by article 3 ECHR, or in other words, that living below a humane minimum subsistence level was ruled out. Insofar as the guidelines issued by the High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), or the literature, or jurisprudence partly argue that the securing of an economic minimum subsistence level must exceed an indispensable protection of fundamental and human rights characterised by article 3 ECHR, this view cannot be concurred with. However, there must be a considerable probability to believe that the general conditions in the place of settlement would ensure the minimum subsistence level thus defined; to that extent, the defendant bore the burden of proof (or persuasion) with regard to the circumstances due to which it appears reasonable to expect settlement in the place of internal protection. According to these principles the factual findings concerning the situation in Afghanistan must be assessed to the effect that the claimant, for whom no special circumstances that increase a threat or impediments to securing subsistence could be found, would be able to sufficiently secure his minimum subsistence level.

In his appeal on points of law the claimant asserts of a violation of section 4 (3) in conjunction with section 3e AsylG, and states: For a reasonable expectation of settlement, requirements going beyond securing a minimum subsistence level must be applied. In its assessment of general living conditions, therefore, the Court of Appeal applied an overly strict standard contrary to federal law, and consequently arrived at inadequate factual findings concerning the reasonable expectation of settlement. The very wording, which focuses on the reasonable expectation of "settlement" (Niederlassung), indicated that a permanent home must be possible, with a genuine economic and cultural participation comparable to that of the population already resident in that place.

The person seeking protection could not return to his or her "old life", and in that sense cannot resume his former living situation in the place of internal protection. The claimant finds confirmation of this in the jurisprudence described by the Court of Appeal, which sets more extensive requirements.

The defendant defends the contested judgment. In determining a reasonable expectation of internal protection, the Court of Appeal specifically did not proceed from the assumption that a "mere vegetating at the margins of a minimal subsistence level" could also reasonably be expected, but rather, consistently with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, hereinafter Court of Justice), it based its reasoning on the principle that in considering reasonable expectation, account must not only be taken of a(n impending) threat to article 3 ECHR, but also of other, serious violations of fundamental and human rights, or other unbearable hardship. An impermissible conflict of assessments would result if, with reference to the economic conditions in the place of internal protection, settlement were to be categorised as unreasonable on grounds that would not constitute a threat relevant to refugee protection within the meaning of sections 3 and 4 AsylG for persons already living in the place of internal protection.

The Representative of the Interests of the Federation (Vertreter des Bundesinteresses) did not take part in the proceedings.

10 The claimant's appeal, which, with the consent of the parties, this Court can decide without oral proceedings (section 101 (2) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung)), does not meet with success. The Higher Administrative Court decided, with no breach of federal law, that at the relevant time for that court's decision, the claimant could reasonably be expected to settle in one of the places of internal protection designated in that decision (1.). In particular, the Court applied a correct legal standard for the assessment of the requirements to be imposed on the securing of an economic subsistence in in the context of internal protection (2.). The claimant is not protected by national deportation bans (3.). The appeal on points of law is unsuccessful also with regard to all other aspects (4.).

11 The legal assessment of the claimant's request on the granting of subsidiary protection is governed by the Asylum Act, in its latest version (currently: the version promulgated on 2 September 2008 <Federal Law Gazette (BGBl., Bundesgesetzblatt) I p. 1798>, last amended by the Fifty-ninth Act Amending the Criminal Code - Improvement of Protection of Personality Rights in the case of Image Recordings (StrÄndG 59, Neunundfünfzigstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuches - Verbesserung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes bei Bildaufnahmen) of 9 October 2020 that entered into force on 1 January 2021 <BGBl. I p. 2250>). Changes in the law occurring after the last oral hearing or the decision of the court responsible for finding the facts must be taken into consideration in appeal proceedings on points of law if they had to be considered by the court responsible for finding the facts - if it were to decide instead of the court deciding on appeals on points of law (Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG, Bundesverwaltungsgericht), judgment of 11 September 2007 - 10 C 8.07 - Rulings of the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts) 129, 251 para. 19). Since the present case concerns a dispute under asylum law where the court responsible for finding the facts regularly had to refer to the factual and legal situation at the time of the last oral hearing or the decision pursuant to section 77 (1) AsylG, it would have to base a decision on the latest version if it were to decide on the matter now, unless a derogation is required for reasons of substantive law (established jurisprudence, see BVerwG, judgment of 20 February 2013 - 10 C 23.12 - BVerwGE 146, 67 para. 12). The decisive provisions have not changed since the oral hearing before the Higher Administrative Court.

12 Because of the relevant date for assessing the factual situation, the change in conditions in the country of origin since November 2019 must be left out of consideration; it is therefore immaterial to the appeal proceedings on points of law that in light of the serious deterioration of the economic environment in Afghanistan because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Appeal has amended its jurisprudence, and even in the case of a capable, adult man without obligations to provide maintenance, it holds that the high requirements for a deportation ban under section 60 (5) of the Residence Act (AufenthG, Aufenthaltsgesetz), in conjunction with article 3 ECHR, are currently regularly met in case of a return from a western foreign country, unless the individual's person offers special favouring circumstances (VGH Mannheim, judgment of 17 December 2020 - A 11 S 2042/20 [ECLI:DE:VGHBW:2020: 1217.A11S2042.20.00] - (...); still dissenting, VGH Munich, judgment of 26 October 2020 - 13a B 20 March 1087 - (...)).

13 1. A granting of subsidiary protection for the claimant, concerning whom the Court of Appeal did not conclusively examine whether the requirements for subsidiary protection (section 4 AsylG) were met at his place of origin, but also did not deny them, is precluded by the fact that - subject to the economic conditions for subsistence, which are to be addressed separately (2.) - he can be referred to the cities of Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif as places of internal protection, in accordance with section 4 (3) first sentence in conjunction with section 3e (1) AsylG. On the basis of a standard compatible with federal law, the Court of Appeal arrived, without procedural error, at the assessment that the claimant has no well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm in these parts of the country (section 3e (1) no. 1 AsylG) (1.1), that he can travel safely and lawfully to that area of the country (1.2), and that he would be admitted there (1.3).

14 1.1 a) The question whether a foreign national will not be subject to impending threats relevant to international protection in another part of the country is as a rule relevant to a decision only if the impending threats in that other part of the country do not proceed from the state. Recital 27 second sentence of Directive 2011/95/EU is founded on the principle that in the event of persecution by the state, there should be a presumption that the applicant has no effective protection available. If a threat situation within the meaning of section 3 (1) and section 4 (1) AsylG proceeds from another agent of persecution, such as a party or organisation that controls the state or substantial parts of the national territory (section 3c no. 2 AsylG), and if that threat only exists in a part of his or her country of origin, referring the foreign national to another part of the country as a place of internal protection presupposes that there is a considerable probability to believe he or she will not be at risk of a threat situation that is relevant to international protection.

15 Pursuant to article 4 (4) of Directive 2011/95/EU, the fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm in one part of a country is a serious indication of the applicant's well-founded fear of renewed persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm in the place of internal protection, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. In refuting this presumption, the finding of a general change in internal political conditions in the country of origin must not wait to be deemed a "good reason" within the meaning of article 4 (4) of Directive 2011/95/EU until the permanence of that change is established under the principles developed under article 11 (2) of that Directive for determining the cessation of such circumstances; the good reasons referred to in article 4 (4) of Directive 2011/95/EU serve to invalidate a rule on the burden of proof that privileges the applicant, which must be followed by a comprehensive review of the asserted reasons for protection - even if the expiry of that privilege has been established (BVerwG, decision of 17 September 2019 - 1 B 43.19 [ECLI:DE: BVerwG:2019:170919B1B43.19.0] - (...)). This review itself must then follow the principles laid down by the Court of Justice for examining whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm (CJEU, judgment of 2 March 2010 - C-175/08 et al. [ECLI:EU:C:2010:105], Abdulla et al. - para. 55 et seqq., 93; see also BVerwG, judgment of 1 June 2011 - 10 C 25.10 - BVerwGE 140, 22 para. 18 et seqq.).

16 b) In compliance with these principles, making a detailed assessment of sufficiently detailed and accurate information (section 3e (2) second sentence AsylG) about the general circumstances prevailing in the place of internal protection, particularly also taking account of information from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the Court of Appeal arrived at the determination that in the designated places of internal protection, the claimant in particular did not face either a threat ("real risk") of (resumed) persecution by the Taliban, nor - irrespective of the sometimes precarious security situation - was there any serious individual threat to his life or physical integrity by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of internal armed conflict. No admissible, well-founded complaints on points of law against these findings have been brought, so that they are binding on the Senate (section 137 (2) VwGO)

17 1.2 The claimant can in fact travel safely and lawfully to the places of internal protection assumed by the Court of Appeal.

18 a) Factual accessibility presupposes that there are usable transport connections, from the place of actual residence (region of origin; place where external protection is requested) to the place of internal protection, that may be used without disproportionate difficulty, and also at a cost that is not impossible or unreasonable for the foreign national to afford. Section 3e (1) no. 2 AsylG/article 8 (1) of Directive 2011/95/EU supersedes jurisprudence founded on a previous legal situation, under which temporary impediments to a return, such as interrupted transport connections, were deemed irrelevant (see, still, BVerwG, judgment of 29 May 2008 - 10 C 11.07 - BVerwGE 131, 186 para. 20).

19 A place of internal protection can be travelled to "lawfully" if it can be reached by using lawfully usable transport connections. The foreign national is not called upon to engage in unlawful conduct in order to reach the place of internal protection. But the foreign national himself or herself does not need to be allowed by law to choose and use such modes of transport or the travel route entirely freely; requirements for registration or approval are in any case irrelevant if they are established on legitimate grounds (such as for security purposes) and the foreign national also has an actual, real possibility of obtaining the relevant approval. Roadside checks on the travel route, or other administrative restrictions on travel that do not (lastingly) impair onward travel per se are irrelevant. Finally, access to the territories of internal protection, with the aim of in-migration there, must be neither entirely prohibited by law, nor possible only subject to objectively unjustified requirements (e.g., approvals) that the foreign national in fact either cannot meet or can meet only subject to conditions that he or she cannot reasonably be expected to fulfil.

20 A place of internal protection can be travelled to "safely" if means of transport or a travel route are available which the foreign national can use without a considerable probability for believing that he or she would face the risk of attack by agents of persecution, or of suffering serious harm.

21 b) Taking account of these principles, the Court of Appeal found - and its findings are binding on the Senate (section 137 (2) VwGO) - that it is in fact possible to travel safely and lawfully, at any event by air, to the places of internal protection that it designated. Consistently with federal law (section 77 AsylG), it based its designation of the place from which travel is to commence on the date of its decision.

22 1.3 The claimant could also expect to be admitted at the places of internal protection.

23 a) A foreign national gains "admittance" to a place of internal protection if, upon travelling there lawfully, he or she does not merely receive a first-time access, but can lawfully establish his or her habitual residence there. Permanent residence therefore must not be entirely prohibited by law or by administrative restrictions, or be made contingent on requirements that the foreign national in fact cannot meet, or can meet only subject to conditions he or she cannot reasonably be expected to fulfil. Therefore this cannot be an unlawful residence, and in that sense a impermanent residence, such that the foreign national must expect to have it terminated at any time; measures limiting residence, time limits or other conditions that in fact are not enforced, and for which noncompliance is tolerated, are irrelevant.

24 The concept of "gaining admittance" raises no further requirements for the quality of residence beyond the possibility of a more than temporary, sufficiently safe physical presence in the place of internal protection. Internal protection should simply be effective and of a non-temporary nature (recital 26 of Directive 2011/95/EU). However, "admittance" must be distinguished from the reasonable expectation of settlement. "Admittance" implies nothing about admittance conditions, and even purely conceptually, in particular does not include positive measures at the place of admittance, such as specific measures for support and integration, enablement of a non-discriminatory and equal participation in public life, or other measures for socio-economic integration (...). This is confirmed, not least of all, by the English and French versions of article 8 (1) of Directive 2011/95/EU ("gain admittance"; "obtenir l'autorisation d'y pénétrer"). As long as physical presence in the place of internal protection is in fact lawfully possible, or at least reliably tolerated, the questions of the admittance capabilities of a place or a part of a country need only and solely to be taken into account in connection with the review of whether settlement can reasonably be expected, only if they affect the living conditions and conditions for admittance of internally displaced persons or returnees, and at the same time, cause those conditions to fall short of the minimum standard to be maintained under article 3 ECHR.

25 b) The findings of the Court of Appeal, which have not been challenged by procedural complaints and are therefore binding (section 137 (2) VwGO), do not indicate that either in-migration nor subsequent residence in the cities designated as places of internal protection would be restricted by law or administrative practice.

26 2. The Court of Appeal arrived consistently with federal law at the assessment that the claimant can reasonably be expected to settle in one of the designated cities (reasonableness of settlement).

27 The question of the reasonable expectation of settlement calls for a comprehensive, evaluative overall consideration of both general and individual circumstances, taking account of the dimensions referred to in section 3e (2) first sentence AsylG (2.1). Here attention must be given also and particularly to the economic conditions that the foreign national must expect in the place of settlement. A necessary but also sufficient prerequisite for settlement is that an economic minimum subsistence level must be secured at a standard that does not raise concerns about a violation of article 3 ECHR; requirements going beyond that are not a necessary prerequisite in order for settlement to be reasonably expected (2.2). The Senate can decide with no need for further prior clarification by the Court of Justice in the present case constellation of a country which - like Afghanistan - has high levels of poverty (2.3). On the basis of these standards, the Court of Appeal affirmed with no breach of federal law that settlement could reasonably be expected (2.4).

28 2.1 The reasonable expectation of settlement exists independently from safety from (renewed) persecution or the risk of serious harm (section 3e (1) no. 1 AsylG). Settlement can reasonably be expected if, in the place of internal protection, there is a considerable probability to believe there are no other threats or disadvantages which, in their intensity and severity, are equivalent to an impairment of legally protected interests that is relevant to international protection. However, where there is a reasonable expectation that internal protection can be made use of, the prerequisites for granting international protection are not met.

29 Section 3e (1) no. 2 AsylG serves indirectly to protect against refoulement. The general circumstances that prevail for a foreign national at a safe place of internal protection where he or she is free from persecution should not compel this person to abandon safety from persecution, to return to the original territory of persecution, or to go to another part of the country where persecution or other forms of serious harm may be a possibility (see no. 21 of the UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative" within the context of article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/04 of 23 July 2003 - hereinafter 2003 UNHCR Guidelines; ECtHR, judgments of 28 June 2011 - Application no. 8319/07, 11449/07 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0628JUD000831907], Sufi and Elmi/United Kingdom - para. 267 et seqq., of 27 June 2013 - Application no. 68335/10 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0627JUD006833510], N.M.B./Sweden - para. 37 and - Application no. 28379/11 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0627JUD002837911], D.N.M./Sweden - para. 54; Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, Bundesverfassungsgericht), decisions of 10 July 1989 - 2 BvR 502/86 et al. - Rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts) 80, 315 <343 et seq.> and of 10 November 1989 - 2 BvR 403/84 et al. - BVerfGE 81, 58 <65 et seq.>; chamber decision of 24 March 1997 - 2 BvR 1024/95 - (...)).

30 The reasonable expectation of settlement at the place of internal protection therefore remains embedded in the context of refugee law. It is not intended to ensure comprehensively the fundamental or human rights contained in codifications under international and EU law; absent a disregard for fundamental standards of human rights, a territory is not disqualified as a place of internal protection solely because of a "deprivation of [a] civil, political or socio-economic human right in the proposed area" (no. 28, 2003 UNHCR Guidelines). As a rule, a deprivation of fundamental or human rights of a civil, political, social and collective nature that is not sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute an act of persecution, either alone or cumulatively (section 3a (1) AsylG), is not sufficient; conversely, a deprivation of fundamental human rights that must qualify as an act of persecution makes settlement at the place of internal protection fundamentally unreasonable even if the serious violation of basic human rights is not attributable, within the meaning of section 3a (3) AsylG, to a ground for persecution (section 3b AsylG), or does not proceed from an agent of persecution (section 3c AsylG). Equivalent considerations apply by way of section 4 (3) AsylG in the case of subsidiary protection. The present case offers no reason to conclusively discuss the question of what circumstances, in cases where the requirements of section 3a (1) AsylG are not met, would have to apply in order that a disregard of human rights in the place of internal protection would make it unreasonable to expect settlement.

31 According to section 3e (2) first sentence AsylG, whether these requirements are also met must be examined in accordance with article 4 of Directive 2011/95/EU, taking into account the general circumstances prevailing in the place of internal protection, particularly the economic and humanitarian conditions, including healthcare, as well as the foreign national's personal circumstances, particularly family and social background, gender and age. Relevant factors mentioned in no. 25 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines are age, sex, health, disability, family situation and relationships, social or other vulnerabilities, ethnic, cultural or religious considerations, political and social links and compatibility, language abilities, educational, professional and work background and opportunities, and any past persecution and its psychological effects. The standard for a reasonable expectation is therefore not a "(hypothetical) reasonable person" or a mode of consideration abstracted from individual particularities. Consideration must be given to the individual person seeking protection and his or her specific possibilities of living and surviving in the place of internal protection. This specifically individualised mode of consideration does not, however, have any effect - still less, necessarily or regularly - on what living and developmental opportunities must be secured, and at what standard; it shapes the assessment of whether the reasonable minimum standard in terms of human rights can also be secured in each individual case.

32 In the overall consideration to be applied here, taking account of general circumstances in the place of internal protection also affects what specific guarantees proceed from fundamental and human rights. The Court of Appeal, following the same lines as the UNHCR (no. 25 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines), holds that in exceptional cases it may sometimes be unreasonable to expect settlement in a place of internal protection even if there is no risk of a violation of fundamental or human rights, for instance if for other reasons such a settlement would signify an unbearable hardship for the person concerned because he or she would be isolated for cultural or ethnic reasons, or would suffer substantial discrimination from the majority population, such that living without unbearable hardship would be impossible.

33 2.2 The question the Senate has hitherto left open (BVerwG, judgments of 29 May 2008 - 10 C 11.07 - BVerwGE 131, 186 para. 35 and of 31 January 2013 - 10 C 15.12 - BVerwGE 146, 12 para. 20; decision of 14 November 2012 - 10 B 22.12 - (...)) of what further economic and social standards govern the standard of reasonable expectation must, concurring with the Court of Appeal, be answered, with reference to the economic minimum subsistence level, as follows: securing the minimum subsistence level required by article 3 ECHR is not just a necessary, but also a sufficient prerequisite for a reasonable expectation of settlement. In this regard, the Senate does not fail to recognise that the vast majority of the literature, albeit sometimes to an unspecified extent, holds that a secure economic subsistence level above the requirements of article 3 ECHR is indicated (...).

34 The material conditions for subsistence in the place of internal protection are of particular importance for this reasonable expectation (2.2.1). Further requirements going beyond the minimum subsistence level required by article 3 ECHR do not proceed from either the wording of section 3e (1) AsylG or the requirement under section 3e (2) AsylG that general living conditions in the country of origin should be taken into account (2.2.2). The function attributed to internal protection within the system of international protection - not least of all in comparison with the reasons that may take the effect of establishing protection - argues against any minimum standard for economic living conditions in the place of internal protection above and beyond the minimum standard that proceeds from article 3 ECHR (2.2.3). Equivalent considerations apply for the more recent case-law of the Court of Justice on article 33 (2) (a) of Directive 2013/32/EU (2.2.4). Nor does anything to oppose this view proceed from the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines and the associated jurisprudence (2.2.5). The genesis of article 8 of Directive 2011/95/EU, which section 3e AsylG serves to implement, reinforces maintaining a link with the minimum standard of protection shaped by article 3 ECHR (2.2.6).

35 2.2.1 Within the bounds of the required overall consideration, the Court of Appeal correctly assigned a particular, separable importance to the securing of an economic subsistence at the place of internal protection. This builds on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (see, e.g., ECtHR, judgments of 28 February 2008 - Application no. 37201/06 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0228JUD003720106], Saadi/Italy - (...) para. 125 et seqq. and of 27 May 2008 - Application no. 26565/05 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0527JUD002656505], N./United Kingdom - (...) para. 42; ECtHR, judgment of 28 June 2011 - Application no. 8319/07 and 11449/07 - para. 212) and the jurisprudence of the Senate (see, e.g., BVerwG, judgments of 31 January 2013 - 10 C 15.12 - BVerwGE 146, 12 para. 23, 25 and of 20 February 2013 - 10 C 23.12 - BVerwGE 146, 67 para. 32; decision of 13 February 2019 - 1 B 2.19 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2019:130219B1B2.19.0] - (...)), according to which deportation is precluded if there is a considerable probability to be threatened with a violation of article 3 ECHR at the deportation destination or the place of internal protection because of the humanitarian conditions prevailing there.

36 2.2.2 The wording of section 3e AsylG does not contain any express provisions that prescribe, still less define, any particular minimum standard of economic conditions for subsistence that is required for a reasonable expectation of settlement, and at any event do not require the assurance of an economic minimum subsistence level above the standard guaranteed by article 3 ECHR.

37 a) It does proceed from the concept of settlement that - in terms of time - it must be possible to establish a perspectively permanent residence in the place of internal protection, and that the possibility of a merely temporary sojourn, as a brief interruption of an ongoing flight, is not sufficient (see also Bremen Higher Administrative Court (OVG, Oberverwaltungsgericht), judgment of 26 May 2020 - 1 LB 56/20 [ECLI:DE:OVGHB:2020:0526.1LB56.20.00] - (...) para. 74). This also determines the time frame to be considered in the required prognosis of whether an economic subsistence can be secured with no violation of article 3 ECHR. In substantive terms, however, it does not follow from this concept that the economic and social living conditions - to an extend which must then be justified - must be above the threshold of the minimum subsistence level defined by article 3 ECHR. This also applies to securing the existential basic need for a home, and there, in particular, protection from bad weather; a home of one's own, permanently available for one's sole use, is not required if access to changing accommodations can avert homelessness with sufficient certainty (dissenting opinion OVG Bremen, judgment of 26 May 2020 - 1 LB 56/20 - (...) para. 74 et seqq., 92); collective or camp accommodations that offer safe, weather-proof shelter, and that also ensure humane accommodations otherwise, are not ruled out either.

38 b) The requirement to take account of the general circumstances prevailing in the country of origin (section 3e (2) first sentence AsylG) does not, as a result, indicate, either taken by itself or in conjunction with the concept of "settlement", that the economic conditions for subsistence must be above the threshold of article 3 ECHR in order to make settlement reasonably expectable.

39 The objective of the requirement to take these matters into account is primarily to clarify that in any case the living conditions to be accepted are not governed by the standards that prevail in an external country of refuge where international protection is sought. Irrespective of the fact that article 3 ECHR describes an absolute minimum standard that cannot be weighed against other factors, the general living conditions in the country of origin may, within narrow limits, also influence the specific details of this minimum standard. Taking general conditions into account does not, however, link the reasonable expectation of settlement to a guarantee of economic living conditions above the threshold of a minimum subsistence level. That cannot be, if only because of the relative relationship with general circumstances in the place of internal protection, which alone are to be taken into account (still left undecided BVerwG, judgment of 29 May 2008 - 10 C 11.07 - BVerwGE 131, 186 para. 35 referring to The House of Lords, judgment of 15 February 2006 - Januzi/Secretary of State for the Home Department et al. - (...) para. 47).

40 Just as taking living conditions into account does not permit one to fall below the minimum subsistence level required by article 3 ECHR in the case of countries of origin which, like Afghanistan, are characterised by high levels of poverty, likewise an increase in the standard of protection is indicated with reference to other countries of origin in terms of the material conditions for subsistence. It is not possible to determine with adequate specificity the standard that conditions in the territory must be such that a "relatively normal life" can be led in the context of the country concerned, which is also cited in no. 29 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines (see also Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (VwGH, Verwaltungsgerichtshof), rulings of 8 August 2017 - Ra 2017/19/0118 [ECLI:AT:VWGH:2017:RA2017190118.L00] - para. 22 et seqq. and of 23 January 2018 - Ra 2018/18/0001 [ECLI:AT:VWGH:2018:RA2018180001.L00] - para. 16; (...)). Particularly for societies that are regularly socially inhomogeneous, it still remains unclear which segment of the surrounding society should serve as reference. Nor can the unity of a physical and socio-cultural minimum subsistence level that is enshrined under national law in the basic right to a minimum subsistence level that is in line with human dignity (article 1 (1) in conjunction with article 20 (1) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG)) be transferred to the concept of reasonableness in refugee law under section 3e (1) AsylG; it proceeds from specific requirements of national constitutional law (BVerfG, judgments of 9 February 2010 - 1 BvL 1/09 et al. [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2010:ls20100209.1bvl000109] - BVerfGE 125, 175 <223, 228>, of 18 July 2012 - 1 BvL 10/10 et al. [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2012:ls20120718.1bvl001010] - BVerfGE 132, 134 para. 64 and of 5 November 2019 - 1 BvL 7/16 [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2019:ls20191105.1bvl000716] - BVerfGE 152, 68 para. 119; decision of 23 July 2014 - 1 BvL 10/12 et al. [ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:ls20140723.1bvl001012] - BVerfGE 137, 34 para. 117).

41 2.2.3 A persuasive argument against a minimum standard for a secure economic subsistence in excess of the requirement of article 3 ECHR is that internal protection, as a condition eliminating the need for international protection outside one's own country of origin, pertains to protecting the individual against persecution (sections 3a, 3b AsylG) or serious harm (section 4 AsylG), and thus in a broader sense serves to protect from refoulement; it does not constitute a surrogate for the protection conferred outside the country of origin (...). Living conditions at the place of internal protection, and particularly the securing of a material subsistence, cannot be so poor that the person concerned will see no way out other than to go to territories where he or she faces the risk of persecution or serious harm.

42 a) This function provides both a reason and a limit for the consideration of aspects that are not based on persecution when determining the reasonable expectation of settlement at the place of internal protection. If an economic subsistence within the scope required by human rights is secured at a standard that does not raise concerns about a violation of article 3 ECHR, there is no existential pressure to return to the region of origin. Any broader requirements for the standard of securing a subsistence (thus, e.g., OVG Bremen , judgment of 26 May 2020 - 1 LB 56/20 - (...) para. 68 et seqq., 74 et seqq.) would entail a betterment, which would be in need of justification, over those residents who already live in the place of internal protection without otherwise being persecuted or threatened with serious harm. At any event, so long as the conditions for subsistence comply with the minimum standard under article 3 ECHR, living conditions that must continually be accepted by those who already live in the place of internal protection cannot be categorised as unreasonable for internally displaced persons.

43 b) Nor does any other assessment follow from the fact that because of persecution or serious harm that they have already suffered or that is threatened, internally displaced persons have had to leave their region of origin and to abandon the economic and socio-cultural ties they had there.

44 As the Court of Appeal in substance recognised, this circumstance is to be taken into account first of all in that under article 4 (4) of Directive 2011/95/EU, the fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm is a serious indication of the applicant's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

45 An "uprooting" from one's region of origin compelled by persecution or a threat must furthermore be taken into account in predicting whether the individual will be able, through his or her own efforts or through secured support from third parties, to obtain the minimum subsistence level guaranteed by article 3 ECHR in the place of internal protection. Difficulties in securing an economic subsistence that proceed from such factors as being a stranger to the place of internal protection, having inadequate networks there, or lacking support from family, clan or ethnic group, are among the circumstances that must be taken into account in the specific individual examination under section 3e (2) first sentence AsylG. The guaranteed minimum standard required by article 3 ECHR must also be established to the court's convincement (section 108 (1) first sentence VwGO) for the expanded scope for prognosis that proceeds from the concept of settlement as more than a short-term residence.

46 In this regard, the Court of Appeal correctly reasoned that - unlike when examining the risk of persecution to a person seeking protection who left his or her country without prior persecution (BVerwG, judgment of 4 July 2019 - 1 C 31.18 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2019:040719U1C31.18.0] - (...) para. 27) - the defendant bears the burden of presenting the facts and persuasion of a securing of a minimum subsistence level, and that the person seeking protection does not have to show - or even have to prove - that he or she will not be able to secure a basis for subsistence, and therefore will be exposed to a real risk of living conditions incompatible with article 3 ECHR that he or she cannot avert with reasonable effort (thus also no. 34 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines). Here it must be made sure that an economic subsistence at the standard required by article 3 ECHR will foreseeably be secured even during the first phase of residence in the place of internal protection; even a temporary failure to achieve this standard must be ruled out, even in a phase of possible initial difficulties. By contrast, a "safety markup" of whatever nature on the economic minimum subsistence level guaranteed under article 3 of the ECHR, as a prerequisite for the reasonableness of claiming internal protection, cannot be justified even as only a "cushion" for the prognostic difficulties or uncertainties.

47 Furthermore, if there is no adequate securing of an economic subsistence in the place of internal protection, any unreasonableness of settlement does not depend on whether such uncertainty is also attributable to an agent of persecution within the meaning of section 4 (1) second sentence no. 2 AsylG (see - for the granting of subsidiary protection - BVerwG, judgment of 20 May 2020 - 1 C 11.19 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2020:200520U1C11.19.0] - (...) para. 12). In this regard, the legal consequences take account of prior persecution or harm suffered by internally displaced persons in their home region, for, in contrast to those who leave a place of internal protection solely because of living conditions in breach of human rights, these persons must then be granted international protection.

48 2.2.4 The case-law of the Court of Justice has addressed the question of the conditions under which the granting of subsidiary protection in another Member State precludes the power to reject as inadmissible an application for the granting of refugee status by reason of the living conditions prevailing in that other Member State; and this jurisprudence makes clear, in substance, that a reasonable expectation of settlement can be ruled out only if the economic minimum subsistence level guaranteed by article 3 ECHR is threatened (CJEU, judgment of 19 March 2019 - C-297/17 et al. [ECLI:EU:C:2019:219], Ibrahim et al. -; decision of 13 November 2019 - C-540/17 et al. [ECLI:EU:C:2019:964], Hamed and Omar -).

49 However, this case-law does not pertain to the interpretation of article 8 (1) of Directive 2011/95/EU; it concerns - primarily - the Member States' responsibility for assessing a request for protection, or the power to refer a person seeking protection to claim protection from another Member State. According to this case-law, the failure to comply with guarantees of secondary law (for instance under article 26 et seqq. of Directive 2011/95/EU) does not preclude an inadmissibility decision; if protection is granted elsewhere under article 33 (2) (a) of Directive 2013/32/EU, such a decision is not precluded unless the living conditions that the person could expect to encounter as a recognised refugee in that other Member State would expose him to a substantial risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). Yet in terms of refugee or human rights law, the preservation of the order of responsibilities between the Member States under EU law should not be made subject to a higher level of requirements - limited to securing the minimum standard that proceeds from article 3 ECHR which is to that extent identical with article 4 CFR - than the referral to internal protection in the country of origin. In this respect, nothing is changed by the fact that within the EU it is possible to enforce rights guaranteed under EU law through the regularly available recourse to the courts; for in this regard, EU law goes beyond the requirements of refugee and human rights law.

50 2.2.5 Neither no. 22 et seqq. of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines, nor the jurisprudence that builds thereon with regard to interpretation of the respective terms - for instance from the British House of Lords and the Austrian courts (see 2.2.2 b above) - do contain any further requirements for securing an economic minimum subsistence level within the concept of internal protection that is governed by article 8 of Directive 2011/95/EU and transposed into national law in section 3e AsylG.

51 a) However, the European Union does guarantee the right of asylum, inter alia, in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC) (article 18 CFR). The Common Asylum Policy of the European Union must be in accordance, inter alia, with the Geneva Refugee Convention (article 78 (1) second sentence of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)); the Geneva Refugee Convention provides a cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees (recital 4 of Directive 2011/95/EU); consultations with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees may provide valuable guidance for Member States when determining refugee status according to article 1 GRC (recital 22 of Directive 2011/95/EU). According to the established case-law of the Court of Justice, the Common European Asylum System is based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Refugee Convention (see, e.g., CJEU, judgment of 21 December 2011 - C-411/10 et al. [ECLI:EU:C:2011:865], N.S. et al. - para. 75 et seqq.).

52 This linking of refugee protection under EU law to the principles and requirements of the Geneva Refugee Convention applies, however, primarily for the express provisions of the Convention itself that are binding under international treaty law, and for a consistent state practice that builds thereon. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees must indeed supervise the application of the Convention (article 35 (1) GRC); this includes the possibility of submitting guidelines for interpreting and applying the Geneva Refugee Convention, which shall provide guidance and orientation for the interpretation and application of the Convention, and will thus spill over to the interpretation of EU law. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is not, however, authorised or called upon to issue supplementary rules, or to provide authentic interpretation of the Geneva Refugee Convention that is also binding in detail under international law. His or her guidelines and opinions are also not to be treated as establishing an agreement of the parties regarding the treaty's interpretation (article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), still less any application practice that is binding under international customary law. This is particularly true when - as is the case here - the requirements are concerned for applying a concept like that of internal protection (or of an internal flight alternative), which is not expressly governed by article 1 (A) (2) GRC. The 2003 UNHCR Guidelines particularly refer to themselves as intended "to provide interpretive legal guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary, as well as UNHCR staff carrying out refugee status determination in the field". These Guidelines must of course be taken into account with regard to the concept of internal protection, which became a concept of EU law to be interpreted independently once it was codified for the first time at the EU level in article 8 of Directive 2004/83/EC; but they are not to serve as an authentic interpretation.

53 b) The Senate certainly does not derive from no. 29 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines any clear UNHCR position to the effect that an economic minimum subsistence level above the threshold required under article 3 ECHR is not merely desirable as a matter of refugee policy, but required by refugee or human rights law under the Geneva Refugee Convention. Consistently with the interpretation laid out above, no. 29 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines likewise deems it unreasonable to expect a person seeking protection to relocate "to face economic destitution or existence below at least an adequate level of subsistence". It furthermore emphasises that an expected "lowering of living standards or worsening of economic status may not be sufficient to reject a proposed area as unreasonable". No further reasons are given for the subsequent finding, the intended applicability of which is unclear, that "[c]onditions in the area […] [must be] such that a relatively normal life can be led in the context of the country concerned". The very next sentence qualifies this statement by noting that where there are no family links and no informal social safety net, relocation is not unreasonable as such and absolutely, but only "may not" be reasonable, "unless the person would otherwise be able to sustain a relatively normal life at more than just a minimum subsistence level". At any rate, there is no explanation given as to what legal basis in refugee or human rights law is supposed to justify a general markup of the minimum subsistence level to be guaranteed, or by what criteria a "relatively normal life at more than just a minimum subsistence level" is to be measured, and whether this also applies if conditions in the country of origin as a whole are characterised by poverty, want and privation. Finally, this question is also left undecided in those judgments that draw substantially and linguistically upon no. 29 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines to derive a standard for reasonableness of settlement with reference to economic conditions for subsistence.

54 c) If no. 29 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines is to be understood to mean that a referral to internal protection is reasonable only if the economic minimum subsistence level is secured at a standard above what is required by article 3 ECHR, in any case this is not binding for the interpretation of article 8 (1) of Directive 2011/95/EU. That interpretation - albeit with an uncertain scope - goes beyond what is required by human rights under article 3 ECHR, which of course is always to be secured. The Senate sees no viable reason in terms of human rights or refugee law for diverging insofar from the interpretation of the concept of reasonableness that has previously been shaped by wording and systematic connection. The aim of averting an "undue hardship" which is not further specified especially does not justify such a divergence if the economic conditions in the country of origin are generally characterised by poverty and problematic living conditions.

55 2.2.6 The legislative genesis of the provisions on the concept of internal protection clearly indicates that with reference to economic living conditions, only the risk of a breach of article 3 ECHR must be precluded; in any event, there is no indication that the reasonable expectation of settlement is supposed to be linked to the securing of an economic minimum subsistence level at a standard higher than the one required by article 3 ECHR.

56 a) Section 3e AsylG serves to transpose article 8 of Directive 2011/95/EU (Draft of an Act on the Transposition of Directive 2011/95/EU of 15 April 2013, Bundestag printed paper (BT-Drs., Bundestagsdrucksache) 17/13063 p. 20). The changes in content shown there in comparison to the predecessor provision are limited to the accessibility of the territory of refuge; there are no indications of a change - occasioned by EU law - in the requirements for reasonableness with reference to securing a minimum subsistence level.

57 b) The proposal of the Commission of the European Community for the later provision of article 8 of Directive 2004/83/EC (COM(2001) 510 final, OJ C 51 E of 26 February 2002, p. 325) focuses solely on the requirement that, apart from safety from persecution, there should also otherwise be no well-founded fear of suffering "other serious unjustified harm" in the place of internal protection. The proposed amendment no. 32 of the European Parliament (record of 22 October 2002, OJ C 300 E of 11 December 2003, p. 134 <141>), which was not adopted, provided that the place of internal protection must offer "effective protection from refoulement to the area where the person fears persecution" and "conditions in the area of internal protection must afford at least the same standard of protection of core human rights as the Geneva Convention"; this concentrates on protecting fundamental human rights, and thus, with reference to economic conditions for subsistence, focuses on the standard indicated by article 3 ECHR.

58 c) The Commission proposal to recast the Qualification Directive with Directive 2011/95/EU aimed to redefine the concept of internal protection governed by article 8 of Directive 2004/83/EC in such a way as to ensure compatibility with recent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on article 3 ECHR (COM(2009) 551 final of 21 October 2009, p. 8, 31 - with reference to ECtHR, judgment of 11 January 2007 - Application no. 1948/04 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD000194804], Sheekh/Netherlands -). These changes included, inter alia, safe and lawful travel to the part of the country offering internal protection as a constituent element, and replaced the reasonable expectation of residence there with the concept of settlement. Apart from accessibility and the possibility of settlement, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights cited in the explanatory memorandum focuses, concerning the place of internal protection, only on whether there is a threat of a violation of article 3 ECHR. No reference to the 2003 UNHCR 2003 Guidelines or any other guarantee of economic living conditions above the standard guaranteed by article 3 ECHR appeared in the Commission's draft or was apparent anywhere else in the legislative procedure. The reinclusion of the wording that settlement could be "reasonably expected" emphasises the specifically individualised mode of consideration prescribed by article 8 (2) first sentence of Directive 2011/95/EU, but has no identifiable relationship under EU law to the minimum standards for economic conditions for subsistence at the place of settlement.

59 Therefore, this human-rights approach oriented to securing the requirement under human rights - here under article 3 ECHR - to avert an indirect compulsion, exerted through serious violations of human rights, to return to the territories of persecution, does not adopt a potentially more extensive view expressed by no. 29 of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines. The Senate insofar assumes that the UNHCR Guidelines were known to the institutions of the European Union engaged in the legislative process, and that they deliberately refrained from incorporating it because they saw no requirement to do so in accordance with article 18 CFR or article 78 TFEU.

60 2.3 There are no reasons to bring the matter before the Court of Justice pursuant to article 267 TFEU, at any event for the present constellation concerning a country of origin where living conditions are generally characterised by great poverty.

61 Likewise in view of the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines and the jurisprudence of the courts of other (previous) Member States that build thereon, the Senate has no reasonable doubt that securing an economic subsistence above the requirements of article 3 ECHR is not a necessary prerequisite for a reasonable expectation of settlement at the place of internal protection. However, to date the Court of Justice has not yet explicitly decided on this legal question (thus also EASO, Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Guidance note and common analysis, June 2019, p. 131). Nevertheless, the case-law of the Court of Justice on the unreasonableness of relocation to another Member State (see 2.2.4) and the genesis of article 8 of Directive 2011/95/EU (2.2.6) clearly and unequivocally permit to take recourse, with reference to living conditions, solely to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on article 3 ECHR, and thus to view as both a necessary and a (fundamentally) sufficient condition that in the absence of a threat of a violation of article 3 ECHR, settlement can reasonably be expected.

62 The Senate considers its view corroborated by the EASO's rights-based approach to assessing the expectation of settlement (EASO, see above, p. 131 et seq.). In its country report on Afghanistan, the EASO likewise draws on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on article 3 ECHR, requires that "the general living conditions for the applicant in the proposed area of IPA would not be 'unreasonable or in any way amount to treatment prohibited by article 3 [ECHR]'"), and holds that "(i)n applying the reasonableness test, it should be established that the basic needs of the applicant would be satisfied, such as food, shelter and hygiene" (EASO, see above, p. 132).

63 In the present constellation, the question whether and under what conditions it may become doubtful that it should additionally be required that the foreign national must be able to lead a "(relatively) normal life" in the place of internal protection does not, at any rate, result in any difference in the standard to apply that would be relevant for the decision and might therefore need to be clarified by a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. Such a description of the standard derived from the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines presupposes, as a possible expansion of the standard, findings that materially good to excellent living conditions generally prevail at the place of internal protection, and that because of these conditions, a person seeking protection who has a secured basis for an economic subsistence in the place of internal protection, with no threat to the requirements of article 3 ECHR, is still so far removed in his or her living conditions from the dominant normality of the surrounding society, by living at the economic minimum subsistence level, that not even a "relatively" normal life is achievable, and a discriminatory marginalisation will occur, even irrespective of any reductions that he or she can reasonably be expected to accept in securing a living. The Court of Appeal, as the court responsible for finding the facts, made no such findings and because of the widely known low standard of general living conditions in Afghanistan, it can be ruled out here.

64 2.4 On the basis of its standard, determined with no breach of federal law, the Court of Appeal found, without error of law, that the claimant will not be exposed to the threat of a violation of his rights under article 3 ECHR because of the economic living conditions in the place of internal protection, and that he can therefore reasonably be expected to settle there in this regard as well.

65 a) First of all, consistently with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (on article 3 ECHR) (ECtHR, judgment of 13 December 2016 - Application no. 41738/10 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD004173810], Paposhvili/Belgium - para. 174) and of the Court of Justice of the European Union (on the provision of article 4 CFR, which to this extent has the same content) (CJEU, judgment of 16 February 2017 - C-578/16 PPU [ECLI:EU:C:2017:127], C.K. et al. - para. 68), which has also been reflected in the jurisprudence of the Senate (see, e.g., BVerwG, judgments of 31 January 2013 - 10 C 15.12 - BVerwGE 146, 12 para. 25, of 13 June 2013 - 10 C 13.12 - BVerwGE 147, 8 para. 25 and of 4 July 2019 - 1 C 45.18 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2019:040719U1C45.18.0] - BVerwGE 166, 113 para. 12 et seq.; decision of 8 August 2018 - 1 B 25.18 [ECLI:DE:BVerwG: 2018:080818B1B25.18.0] - (...) para. 11), the Court of Appeal correctly specified the requirements under which the general economic situation and the supply situation with regard to food, living space and healthcare present a threat to the rights under article 3 ECHR of a person seeking protection. This is the case if he or she cannot assure his or her livelihood, cannot find shelter, or has no access to basic medical treatment, or - in a more recent wording by the Court of Justice - the person concerned finds himself "irrespective of his [or her] wishes and his [or her] personal choices, in a situation of extreme material poverty that does not allow him [or her] to meet his [or her] most basic needs, such as, inter alia, food, personal hygiene and a place to live, and that undermines his [or her] physical or mental health or puts him [or her ]in a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity" (CJEU, judgments of 19 March 2019 - C-297/17 et al. - para. 89 et seqq. and - C-163/17 [ECLI:EU:C:2019:218], Jawo - para. 90 et seqq.). There is no need for further clarification, nor is any asserted by the parties.

66 b) In application of these principles, after assessing the consulted evidence and having also adequately dealt with contrary assessments as part of its own assessment of the factual material as the court responsible for finding the facts, the Court of Appeal arrived at the prognosis that the claimant would be able to assure an existential livelihood. No successful complaints as to procedure or substantive law have been raised in this regard.

67 3. No reasons were asserted in the appeal proceedings on points of law, not even subsidiarily, for the claimant to be subsidiarily entitled to any claim to national protection from deportation, under section 60 (5) and (7) first sentence AufenthG and subordinate to the requested subsidiary protection, that might have to be considered in appeal proceedings on points of fact and law or on points of law (BVerwG, judgment of 8 September 2011 - 10 C 15.10 - (...) para. 18 et seqq.; decision of 10 October 2011 - 10 B 24.11 - (...)). At any event, in accordance with the above statements such reasons must be ruled out with regard to any prohibitions of deportation that are linked to economic conditions for subsistence. Material conditions for subsistence at the place of internal protection that fulfil the conditionsof section 60 (7) first sentence AufenthG would in any case preclude reasonableness under section 3e (1) no. 2 AsylG.

68 4. The deportation warning and the time limit of the ban on entry and residence likewise do not raise any concerns under the law that is subject to an appeal on points of law.